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RIVALRY IN PRICE AND VARIETY AMONG
 
SUPERMARKET RETAILERS
 
TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS AND STEPHEN F. HAMILTON 
Recent theoretical models of retail competition suggest that product heterogeneity is critical to retail 
price and variety strategies. This article provides empirical evidence on supermarket retailers’ price 
and variety strategies using a nested constant elasticity of substitution (NCES) modeling framework. 
The model is estimated using chain-level scanner data for four major grocery chains in a large, urban 
West Coast market. The results show that retailers compete for market share using both price and 
variety. While they all tend to follow moderately cooperative pricing strategies, the extent to which 
they follow cooperative strategies in variety is less homogeneous. 
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Between 1980 and 1999, the average number 
of products stocked in the U.S. supermar­
kets increased threefold from 14,145 to 49,225 
(Food Marketing Institute 2004).1 It is not clear 
whether this trend reﬂects a more competitive 
retail industry, or an industry that supports 
higher margins through various forms of non-
price competition. Certainly, there is some 
cause for concern, as growth in the aver­
age number of products stocked in the su­
permarkets increases retail ﬁxed costs and 
limits the ability of smaller food retailers 
to enter the market. However, to the ex­
tent that greater product variety creates bet­
ter matches between consumers and brands, 
growth in the number of products tends 
to increase consumer spending in supermar­
kets, and this raises the return to retailers 
from attracting customers to their stores. A 
greater number of products can thus intensify 
retail price competition between supermar­
kets and produce similar effects as poten­
tial competition from entrants. Does product 
variety selection play a strategic role for su­
permarkets? And, if so, what is the effect 
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1 In the year 2000, 16,390 new ﬂavors, colors, or varieties of prod­
ucts were introduced, compared with 2,689 in 1980. 
of product variety choices on retail price com­
petition? 
This article describes an empirical frame­
work that we use to test the nature of price 
and variety competition among multiproduct 
retailers. Unlike previous empirical work that 
considers only retail competition in prices, a 
structural approach allows us to consider re­
tail competition as arising jointly through the 
selection of prices and product variety. Specif­
ically, the model nests consumer demand at 
both the ﬁrm (or chain) and the product level in 
a single utility-maximization problem that ex­
plicitly accounts for the endogeneity of price 
and variety strategies. 
A number of studies consider treat gro­
cery retailers as local monopolists (Slade 1995; 
Besanko, Gupta, and Jain 1998; Dhar et al. 
2003). This assumption is based on the 
evidence that consumers base their store-
selection decisions on attributes unrelated 
to market prices, such as location, cleanli­
ness, service, and product variety (Walters and 
McKenzie 1988). That is, retailers may use 
these various forms of nonprice competition to 
differentiate themselves into local monopoly 
markets. Moreover, it is also the case that shop­
pers generally ﬁnd it easier to compare prices 
across products within a store than to compare 
prices of common products across retail stores 
(Slade 1995), and this also tends to promote 
localized brand competition.2 Under this view, 
providing product variety would serve as an 
2 Throughout this article, we use the terms “store,” “chain,” and 
“ﬁrm” interchangably as our interest is in ﬁrm-level strategies and 
instrument for retailers to extract multiprod­
uct monopoly rents from consumers through 
“portfolio” pricing. 
But it is also possible that greater retail 
product variety stimulates price competition. 
For example, if consumers base their store-
selection decisions on retailer location, then 
providing more varieties can spread consumer 
transportation cost over a greater number of 
goods, effectively reducing the extent of non-
price retailer differentiation at the individual 
product level where pricing occurs. Indeed, 
a cursory examination of the recent ﬁnan­
cial performance of U.S. supermarket chains 
reveals that the rate of turnover in grocery 
store ownership appears to better approximate 
what we might expect to see under perfect 
competition. It is well known, moreover, that 
supermarket managers seek to maintain the 
competitiveness of their stores across entire 
categories of goods, and accordingly set prices 
in a manner that takes rival retail prices into 
account (McLaughlin, et al. 1999). This idea 
that retailers are not impervious to competi­
tive market forces is consistent with an emerg­
ing body of evidence which suggests that the 
local monopoly view of retailing is not strictly 
true (Chintagunta 2002; Chintagunta, Dube, 
and Singh 2002; Richards and Patterson 2005a; 
2005b). 
In this article, we take the view that con­
sumers make two discrete decisions before 
purchasing a product: (1) which retailer to visit; 
and (2) which products to buy from a particular 
retailer. Shopping in this framework originates 
from a need. The consumer runs out of prod­
ucts x, y, and z, and then decides how to satisfy 
this need by choosing from among ﬁrms i, j, and 
k. The element of consumer store choice tends 
to stimulate intense price and nonprice com­
petition among retailers. However, once con­
sumers arrive at their store choices, retailers 
exercise local monopoly power. Because re­
tail price discrimination is generally not possi­
ble between consumers who are shopping for 
brands and consumers who are shopping for 
stores, retailers use prices and other means, in-
our data are aggregated over all individual stores within each chain. 
Because our data do not describe the many potential dimensions 
of nonprice competition among supermarket retailers (location, 
cleanliness, advertising, etc.), we focus our objectives on a discus­
sion of variety. Other factors are assumed to be included in chain-
level ﬁxed-effects estimates. It is important to note that we assume 
prices are set at the chain, rather than individual store level. Given 
that our data are aggregated to the ﬁrm level and we observe many 
products for which the price stays at a recognizable price point, for 
example, $1.79 per pound, for several weeks, it is clear that this 
price is set for every store in the entire chain. Personal communi­
cation with store managers for two of the sample ﬁrms supports 
this empirical evidence. 
cluding variety provision, to forge a compro­
mise between these two roles. 
We test the model using weekly sales data 
within the fresh fruit category in supermar­
kets in the greater Los Angeles (LA) area. 
Fresh fruit sold at LA supermarkets is an ideal 
product category to study variety decisions for 
several reasons. First, fresh fruit represents 
a unique opportunity to study competition 
that is not driven by manufacturer promotion 
programs, category management, or obliga­
tions created under slotting or pay-to-stay fee 
agreements. Second, LA represents an ideal 
case study because there are a small number 
of retailers who dominate the retail market, 
each retailer follows a price-promotional strat­
egy (HI-LO) as opposed to an every-day-low­
price (EDLP) strategy, and Wal-Mart, which 
does not participate in any national scanner-
data syndication services, does not sell gro­
ceries in the area.3 Third, fresh fruit is an 
unbranded commodity (or else symmetrically 
branded across retailers), and not sold un­
der independent retailer private labels. Fourth, 
fresh fruit at LA supermarkets is priced on a 
chain-wide basis for each retailer, so that fresh 
fruit prices do not differ among stores within 
each retail chain. Finally, survey research 
ﬁnds fresh fruit and vegetable quality and 
availability to be among the most important 
considerations consumers take into account in 
choosing a supermarket.4 This allows for a rel­
atively straightforward empirical examination 
of whether grocery retailers compete in prices, 
variety, both prices and variety, or are insulated 
entirely from either form of competition. 
The remainder of the article is organized 
as follows. The next section reviews the back­
ground literature. The third section delineates 
the empirical model. The fourth section dis­
cusses data and estimation methods, and the 
ﬁfth section presents the results. 
Background 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976) 
were among the ﬁrst to develop formal models 
of product variety and price. The models follow 
3 A HI-LO business model is one in which the retailer maintains 
a relatively high shelf price, but periodically offers signiﬁcant dis­
counts. EDLP retailers, on the other hand, maintain shelf prices 
that are as low as possible and rarely offer specials or discounts. 
Wal-Mart is an example of the latter, while Albertsons is an exam­
ple of the former. 
4 Eighty-ﬁve percent of consumers regard high-quality fruits and 
vegetables to be “very important” to their choice of store (Food 
Marketing Institute 2004), and only cleanliness rates higher among 
store attributes. 
along traditional lines of monopolistic compe­
tition in the sense that product proliferation 
emerges as an equilibrium condition through 
tension between the cost of developing new 
products and the role of new products in in­
creasing total product demand through port­
folio effects. Each product is produced by an 
individual ﬁrm, and ﬁrms (products) enter the 
industry until demand for brands is no longer 
sufﬁcient to recover entry costs. More recently, 
Raubitschek (1987) extends the constant elas­
ticity of substitution (CES) model of Dixit and 
Stiglitz by replacing the equilibrium condition 
with a two-stage optimization process in which 
a centralized manager for each ﬁrm selects the 
number of brands to offer in the ﬁrst stage, 
and then each brand is priced independently 
by individual brand managers in the second 
stage. This approach ignores the coordination 
of pricing decisions across retail products. 
Anderson and de Palma (1992) make the 
useful distinction that differentiation often 
results in the selection of only one retail store 
and only one product, for example, a shoe 
store. They develop a model of price and va­
riety competition in which consumers select 
among stores, and then products within stores, 
according to a nested logit framework. In 
equilibrium, they argue, greater heterogene­
ity among retailers leads to less variety, while 
greater heterogeneity among products within 
each store promotes variety. However, it is well 
understood that the nested logit model, while 
more general than a simple logit in the sense 
that it allows for store and product hetero­
geneity through extreme-value scale parame­
ters, leads to unrealistic substitution patterns 
among products within each nest.5 The nested 
logit approach also implies that a corner solu­
tion must exist at each choice level. de Palma 
et al. (1994) apply this framework to explain 
spatial competition among video store owners 
in prices and variety, but do not formally test 
the implications of the theory.6 Watson (2004) 
formally tests a variety and price game of this 
form under circumstances of endogenous loca­
tion choices and ﬁnds that variety is a concave 
function of the number of local competitors. 
5 The basic problem with the logit model is the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (iia) property, which means that “ . . . the 
ratio of the probabilities for any two alternatives is indepen­
dent of the existence and attributes of any other alternative . . . ” 
(Brownstone and Train 1999, p. 110). While the nested logit model 
avoids the iia property between different nests, the model is still 
subject to this criticism with respect to the choice of products from 
within a particular nest. 
6 The authors address a speciﬁc example, but do not formally 
test the hypotheses. 
Strategic product proliferation is important 
in a nonspatial sense as well. Brander and 
Eaton (1984) develop a model of strategic pre­
emption in which producers of substitutable 
products are likely to monopolize a partic­
ular market segment in order to deter en­
try. Hamilton (2003) synthesizes these two 
branches of the modeling literature by combin­
ing a discrete store-choice model with a model 
of within-store product choice. This model al­
lows for heterogeneity among retail ﬁrms as 
well as heterogeneity among brands, and, un­
like Anderson and de Palma, considers contin­
uous quantity choices and an outside option. 
The outcome is that greater retailer hetero­
geneity leads to a smaller provision of product 
variety, whereas greater heterogeneity among 
products sold by each ﬁrm has an ambiguous 
effect on variety. The reason for this is that 
greater product heterogeneity increases retail 
margins, which increases the return to new 
product introductions, but higher prices also 
dampen retail sales per brand by facilitating 
substitution to the outside good. The present 
article provides an empirical test of these the­
oretical predictions. 
Few empirical studies have examined prod­
uct variety decisions in retail markets. Indeed, 
virtually all previous empirical research on 
the competitive aspects of product variety is 
directed at the manufacturing level, where 
“product lines” are typically comprised of a 
small set of related brands and competitors are 
few (Bayus and Putsis 1999; Kadiyali, Vilcas­
sim, and Chintagunta, 1996, 1999; Dobson and 
Kalish 1988; Oren, Smith, and Wilson 1984). 
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) design and es­
timate a repeated two-period noncooperative 
oligopoly model among the U.S. cigarette man­
ufacturers in which the number of brands is 
a key determinant of demand, but the num­
ber of varieties to offer is not treated as a 
strategic choice variable. Models of product-
line competition in the empirical literature are 
commonly speciﬁed at the level of individual 
brands using product-level conduct parame­
ters, while the proliferation decision, itself, is 
either treated as exogenous (Kadiyali, Vilcas­
sim, and Chintagunta 1996; 1999) or without 
any reference to a structural model of com­
petition (Bayus and Putsis). Kadiyali, Vilcas­
sim, and Chintagunta (1999) demonstrate that 
yogurt producers are able to acquire market 
power through the portfolio effect of offer­
ing a greater array of products, as a larger 
range of products effectively reduces a mea­
sure of the elasticity of demand over their 
whole product line. Draganska and Jain (2005) 
recognize the strategic importance of product-
line length and estimate a model in which the 
number of varieties offered per product line, 
as well as the price of the products, are en­
dogenous determinants of retail demand. Dra­
ganska and Jain follow Berry (1994), Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2000, 
2001) in specifying a logit demand model in 
which product differentiation is reﬂected in 
discrete consumer choices. Although the deci­
sion to introduce new products is presumably 
to attract new customers and/or increase the 
level of consumption of each customer, both of 
which can be accomplished by creating better 
matches between consumers and brands, none 
of these studies explicitly consider the effect of 
product differentiation on the nature of retail 
market competition. 
Empirical Model of Variety Competition 
In this section, we develop an econometric 
model that includes structural equations for: 
(1) equilibrium prices, (2) equilibrium variety 
(number of products per ﬁrm), and (3) the 
market share of each ﬁrm. Rivalry in either 
price or variety, in turn, will be largely deter­
mined by the degree of differentiation between 
ﬁrms, the extent of product differentiation, dif­
ferences in marginal cost (wholesale price), 
and differences in ﬁxed retailing costs. Both 
the degree of product differentiation and ﬁrm 
differentiation, however, are unobserved to 
the econometrician. Therefore, the economet­
ric procedure estimates both product and ﬁrm 
differentiation as unknown parameters. 
Berry; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes; 
Ackerberg and Rysman (2002), and Nevo 
(2000, 2001), among others, explicitly account 
for unobserved product differentiation within 
a discrete choice framework by treating the 
extent of differentiation as a latent variable 
inﬂuencing both competition and demand. 
These studies identify the extent of differ­
entiation in structural supply and demand 
models in which consumer utility is a function 
of both observed and unobserved product 
characteristics. In this context, differentiation 
is inherent in the product itself, and this 
necessarily assumes away any further differ­
entiation created by other channel members. 
Dhar and Cotterill (2003), on the other hand, 
argue that products purchased in retail super­
markets are differentiated in two dimensions: 
(1) from other products in the same store 
according to their embodied attributes, and 
(2) from similar products sold by other ﬁrms 
on the basis of store characteristics. This 
implies that a two-stage model of ﬁrm and 
product choice is required to estimate the 
degree of substitutability both among ﬁrms 
and among products within ﬁrms. We adopt 
a similar conceptual approach here, although 
we employ fundamentally different methods.7 
There are several ways to represent the two-
stage choice process, depending on whether 
each stage is regarded as discrete (one alter­
native is chosen) or continuous (several can 
be chosen). Hanemann (1984) develops an 
econometric framework based on Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980, p. 262) that integrates the 
discrete choice among brands and the con­
tinuous choice of quantity in a single utility-
maximization problem. Vaage (2000) applies 
this model to Norwegian appliance and power 
demand, while Chiang (1991), Chintagunta 
(1993), Richards (2000), and van Oest, Paap, 
and Franses (2004) consider discrete choices 
among brands and continuous quantity pur­
chases. Although this approach accommodates 
discrete / continuous choices in a theoretically 
consistent way, substitution among brands is 
driven entirely by their market share and 
not by fundamental attributes of the choice 
itself (Nevo 2001) and the price-response 
parameter in the brand-choice model is con­
strained to −1.0. Hendel (1999); Kim, Allenby, 
and Rossi (2002); and Dube (2004) develop 
more general models of discrete / continuous 
choice designed to address the problem 
of “multiple discreteness”—when consumers 
buy several ﬂavors or varieties of the same ba­
sic product on each trip to the store. Although 
these models are able to accommodate deci­
sions that consist of a mixture of discrete and 
continuous outcomes, they are more appropri­
ate for household-level data where true corner 
solutions are observed. 
A logical and intuitive alternative to the dis­
crete / continuous approach followed by the 
studies cited above is a nested logit similar 
to Anderson and de Palma (1992) de Palma 
et al. (1994), and Dhar and Cotterill (2003). Al­
though retail grocery shoppers do indeed make 
a discrete choice among ﬁrms, the subsequent 
choice among products, and the quantities of 
each, are more appropriately considered to 
7 Note that it is not strictly necessary to use any type of two-
stage approach in order to recover store- and product-substitution 
elasticities. Villas-Boas (2003) uses a set of brand-store dummy 
variables in a single-level logit model to accomplish the same task. 
� � 
be continuous. Consequently, we adopt an ap­
proach that offers both a more general treat­
ment of substitutability among products, while 
retaining the nested decision logic inherent 
in shoppers’ decisions between quality differ­
entiated ﬁrms and products within ﬁrms—the 
nested CES (NCES). 
The NCES model has several advantages. 
The model permits general substitution rela­
tionships among alternatives, is parsimonious 
in parameter space, allows for complementar­
ity, has the potential to be ﬂexible, and ﬁnally, 
appears to perform well in empirical applica­
tion (Brown and Heien 1972; Morey, Brefﬂe, 
and Greene, 2001).8 As our focus is on the 
choice made during a single shopping occasion, 
we assume that a household maximizes utility 
over the products purchased on each shopping 
trip. Further, we assume that the consumer ﬁrst 
chooses among the products she wishes to buy, 
and then decides from which ﬁrm to purchase 
the entire bundle, based on considerations of 
both cost and inherent quality of the ﬁrm’s 
stores. 
Using a two-level NCES speciﬁcation, the 
indirect utility function for this problem is 
written as: 
(1) V (pij, y) 
1/(1−)⎡ 
I
� 
Ni
�(1−)/(1−i) 
⎤ 
= ⎣ pˆ1ij −i ⎦ y 
i=1 j=1 
where y is income, i is the elasticity of substi­
tution among j products in ﬁrm i, and  is the 
elasticity of substitution among ﬁrms (and the 
outside option) in a given market. Analogous 
to the nested logit model of price and vari­
ety competition of Anderson and de Palma 
(1992), i represents the degree of heterogene­
ity among products within a given ﬁrm (prod­
uct heterogeneity) and  represents the degree 
of heterogeneity among ﬁrms (retailer hetero­
geneity). Concavity requires k ∈ [ 0,  ∞) and, 
to allow for the possibility of corner solutions 
with respect to ﬁrm choice,  > 1. 
For retailers who sell many highly substi­
tutable products with little heterogeneity (e.g., 
a seller of submarine sandwiches) i is likely 
to be high relative to  . However, for retailers 
8 Brown and Heien (1972) call their NCES model the S-branch 
utility tree. This speciﬁcation was, however, later criticized by 
Blackorby, Boyce, and Russell (1978) because it implies that pref­
erences are afﬁne homothetic. They reject this attribute of the S-
branch model by specifying a more general Gorman Polar Form 
model that nests the S-branch as a special case. 
who sell products meeting many different and 
diverse needs, like supermarkets, substitution 
among ﬁrms is likely to be greater than within 
ﬁrms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) main­
tain that retail markets with a high degree 
of product heterogeneity are likely to have 
a few ﬁrms offering many different products, 
whereas markets with a high degree of retailer 
heterogeneity tend to have more ﬁrms, but 
more limited offerings. This is because retailer 
heterogeneity has no effect on variety provi­
sion in their model, and serves only to increase 
prices. Hamilton (2003) argues that greater re­
tailer heterogeneity raises retail prices, but re­
duces product variety and stimulates retailer 
entry by reducing ﬁxed costs of entry. Al­
though the number of ﬁrms is not endoge­
nous in our model, we nonetheless are able 
to test these hypotheses regarding the number 
of products offered within each retail outlet. 
Prices are adjusted for the inherent 
“quality” of each product and ﬁrm in a man­
ner similar to that suggested by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), and Hanemann (1984) so 
that corner solutions result from a utility-
maximizing decision. Speciﬁcally, we multiply 
observed prices by a quality index function,� ij. 
Because the quality index must be strictly pos­
itive, we use an exponential form in various 
quality attributes: 
(2) �ij = (exp(1ij + 2ijzij + 3ijzpij + 4ij Ni 
+ 5ijm1 + 6ijm2 + 7ijm3))i/(1−i) 
where 1ij is an idiosyncratic preference pa­
rameter, zij is a binary variable indicating 
whether or not the product was on a promo­
tion during the week, zpij is an interaction 
term between the promotion dummy and shelf 
price,Ni is the number of products offered by 
ﬁrm i, and mk are seasonal dummy variables. 
Multiplying � by the price provides a qual­
ity adjusted price so that pˆij = �ij pij for each 
j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Ni products per ﬁrm and i = 
1, 2, 3, . . . , I ﬁrms. Each quality index must be 
CES in order to ensure that the price aggrega­
tor remains CES. Further, by multiplying each 
price by � ij we retain the central insight pro­
vided by Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) ap­
proach, namely if the ratio of price to quality 
is lower for good A than B, ceteris paribus, 
then good A will be chosen. This is a discrete 
choice, or a corner solution. Applying Roy’s 
Identity to (1) and simplifying provides the 
share equations for each choice of ﬁrm and 
product: 
� � �  � 
� � 
� 
� � 
� 
� 
1−i P1−pˆ
(3)	 Sij = �Ni
ij 
1−i �N 
i 
pˆ i=1 P
1− 
j=1 ij i 
�Ni 1−i )1/(1−i)where Pi = ( pˆ is the price­j=1 ij 
aggregator function, or price index, for ﬁrm i 
and Sij represents the market share (measured 
as the share of total market expenditure) of 
product j sold by ﬁrm i . In our  application of 
the NCES to ﬁrm and product choice, we also 
include an outside option to allow for the fact 
that shoppers can buy fresh fruit from places 
other than the major retail ﬁrms described by 
our data. Consequently, share expansion can 
indeed represent category growth for any of 
the ﬁrms considered here. An estimable form 
of (3) is created by expressing each share in 
logs and adding an independent and identically 
distributed (iid) error term, ij: 
(4) log(Sij) − (1 − i) log( pˆij) 
Ni
1 − i+ log pˆ − (1 − )Piij 
j=1 
I
P1 − + log = 1iji 
i=1 
for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , I and j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , Ni. In  
the estimation procedure, the set of equations 
in (4) are estimated with the log-market share 
as the dependent variable. Estimating (4) on 
its own, however, provides no information on 
how ﬁrms interact in prices and variety. 
To gain insight as to how variety effects price 
competition, and vice versa, we also specify 
a model of the supply side of the retail sec­
tor.9 Estimating equations for each ﬁrm’s price 
and variety decision is also necessary because 
both are clearly endogenous in the NCES 
demand model described above. Even if nei­
ther prices nor variety are strategic variables 
for retailers, as in the competitive model, they 
are nevertheless likely to be endogenous for 
the more subtle reasons cited by Villas-Boas 
and Winer (1999) and Villas-Boas and Zhao 
(2003). Namely, both prices and the number of 
product types offered for sale are set by retail 
managers who are able to observe market sig­
nals that are not observable to the researcher. 
9 Our focus here is on interaction only among retailers. Studies by 
Choi (1991), and more recently Sudhir (2001) and Villas-Boas and 
Zhao (2003), formally model the nature of manufacturer-retailer 
interactions but assume a highly simpliﬁed retail market. Villas-
Boas (2003) provides a more detailed analysis of vertical relation­
ships among retailers and manufacturers of a particular consumer-
packaged good. 
For example, display alignment, shelf space, in-
store specials, mass advertising, and supplier 
concerns may be taken into account in mar­
keting decisions, and these considerations are 
unlikely to be independent of price and va­
riety outcomes. In order to address these en­
dogeneity issues, the demand system in (4) is 
estimated using an instrumental variables ap­
proach, which we describe in greater detail be­
low. 
Because the ﬁrst-order conditions for the 
NCES system are highly nonlinear, we fol­
low Dhar, et al. (2003) in deriving general 
ﬁrst-order conditions in terms of elasticities 
only.10 Draganska and Jain (2005) also derive 
the supply side for ﬁrms that choose both price 
and product-line length, but assume Bertrand– 
Nash behavior with respect to both variables. 
The model used here differs from Draganska 
and Jain in that we allow for a more general 
Nash behavior and estimate behavior at the 
ﬁrm level, rather than at the individual prod­
uct level. Focusing on ﬁrm-level strategies has 
both logical and practical appeal. First, man­
agers in a given city do not compare prices 
with rivals’ on an individual product level, but 
rather category by category. Second, variety 
is more meaningful on a ﬁrm level (number of 
produce stock keeping units [SKUs]) than with 
respect to individual product lines (number of 
different sizes of apple), and this is particularly 
true for the fresh produce data used in this arti­
cle. Third, for practical reasons, estimating the 
entire four-ﬁrm and ﬁve-product model would 
create an unreasonably high number of param­
eters to estimate, particularly given that we 
include both price and variety reactions. As­
suming nonjointness of production, the proﬁt 
equation for ﬁrm i is written as: 
(5) i = M Sij(pij − cij) − gi(Ni) 
j∈Ni 
= MSi(Pi − Ci) − gi(Ni) 
where M is the total market size, cij is the 
marginal cost of retailing, and Pi and Ci are 
retail and wholesale CES price indices, respec­
tively. This cost is assumed to be separable be­
tween wholesaling and a Generalized Leontief 
retail unit-cost function, so that unit-retailing 
costs are written as: 
10 Dhar et al. extend the general notation for the ﬁrst-order con­
ditions of a proﬁt maximizing multiproduct ﬁrm presented by Nevo 
(2001) by demonstrating that the estimation of conduct parame­
ters requires only elasticities from the demand system, along with 
measures of cost and other supply shifters as required. 
� � � 
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� 
� 
� 
� � 
� 
� 
� 
(6)	 cij = wij + kk+ kl(kl)1/2 
k k l 
where wij is the wholesale (free on board 
[FOB]) price of product j, k is a vector of input 
prices that includes retail labor costs, market­
ing costs, and FIRE (ﬁnance, insurance, and 
real estate) costs, and  k and  kl are parame­
ters to be estimated. Firm proﬁt also includes 
certain ﬁxed costs of variety, which encompass 
the costs of either developing and marketing 
private labels, or introducing and shelving ex­
ternal brands. Draganska and Jain (2005) ar­
gue that these costs are convex as greater va­
riety imposes higher costs on the ﬁrm. To cap­
ture this effect, we model variety costs as a 
quadratic function: gi(Ni) = i1Ni + 0.5i2N2i , 
which, of course, implies linear marginal costs 
of variety. 
Unlike Draganska and Jain, we allow for 
general price and variety behavior by introduc­
ing conduct parameters, or conjectural elastici­
ties, with respect to both price and variety. Fur­
ther, ﬁrms are assumed to form expectations 
of others’ reactions to changes in both price 
and product line. In other words, we estimate 
cross-variable conduct parameters similar to 
Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta (1996) 
so that we can test for whether ﬁrms respond 
to changes in price with changes in product line 
and vice versa. In this way, the NCES model 
reﬂects an inherently “nested” problem in that 
each ﬁrm’s prices and product lines are deter­
mined by decisions made within other ﬁrms as 
well as for internal considerations. Taking this 
into account, the ﬁrst-order condition with re­
spect to the price index of retailer i becomes: 
∂i	 ∂Si ∂Pk(7) = Si M + (Pi − Ci) M 
∂Pi k ∂Pk ∂Pi 
∂Si	 ∂Nk + (Pi − Ci) M = 0, 
k 
∂Nk ∂ Pi 
k = 1, 2, . . . , I 
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect 
to variety, or product-line length for retailer i 
is given by: 
∂i ∂Si ∂Nk(8) = (Pi − Ci) M 
∂Ni k ∂Nk ∂Ni 
∂Si ∂Pk + (Pi − Ci) M − 1i 
k 
∂Pk ∂Ni 
− 2i Ni = 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , I 
where the terms ∂Pk/∂Pi, ∂Nk/∂Pi, ∂Nk/∂Ni, 
∂Pk/∂Ni, represent ﬁrm i’s expectation of ﬁrm 
k’s response to changes in its chain-wide “aver­
age” price and the variety of products on offer. 
These equations can be simpliﬁed by writing 
each in terms of demand and response elastic­
ities (Dhar and Cotterill 2003), and measures 
of total category cost (ei) and revenue (ri). Do­
ing so results in an estimable system of price : 
(9)	 ri + (ri − ei)εik	ik + (ri − ei)
ikik 
k k 
= 2i , k = 1, 2, . . . , I 
and variety equations: 
(10)	 1i Ni − 2i N 2 − (ri − ei) 
ii + 
ikik 
� 
k 
i 
+	 εikik = 3i, k = 1, 2, . . . , I 
k 
where εik is the price elasticity of demand of 
product i with respect to the price of ﬁrm k, 
ik 
is the “variety elasticity” of demand of prod­
uct i with respect to the number of products 
offered by k, 	ik is the conjectural elasticity of 
ﬁrm k’s price with respect to a change in ﬁrm 
i’s price, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm 
k’s product-line length with respect to ﬁrm i’s 
price, ik is the elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety re­
sponse to an increase in offerings by ﬁrm i,  ik 
is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price re­
sponse to a change in ﬁrm i’s variety, and 2i 
and 3i are econometric error terms. The ex­
pression for retailing costs in (6) is substituted 
into (9) and (10) prior to estimation. 
As a result, the entire system consists of two 
blocks of equations: (1) the demand block de­
scribed in (4) that consists of 20 equations (four 
stores with ﬁve products each), (2) the price 
and variety response block described in (9) and 
(10) that consists of eight equations in total— 
four price response equations and four vari­
ety response equations. While estimation of 
the entire system together would be preferable 
on efﬁciency grounds, the size of the problem 
requires a sequential estimation approach in 
which the cross-equation restrictions implied 
by the previous stage are imposed at each iter­
ation. As explained in greater detail below, all 
parameter estimates are obtained by nonlin­
ear three-stage least squares (NL3SLS) within 
each block of equations. Because NL3SLS is a 
nonlinear estimation method, each equation is 
estimated with the dependent variable in im­
plicit form as shown in (9)–(10) above. 
Data and Estimation Methods 
The retail price, quantity, and promotional 
data base consists of two years (January 1998– 
December 1999) of weekly scanner data for 
ﬁve products in a single category (fresh fruit) 
from four major supermarket ﬁrms in the LA 
market.11 Retailer-speciﬁc data are used to 
identify competitive interactions among the 
four retail ﬁrms, while product-speciﬁc data 
provide the measure of heterogeneity among 
products within each ﬁrm. Because we are in­
terested in ﬁrm-level pricing and variety strate­
gies, the data are aggregated over all stores for 
each of the four chains. Scanner data for per­
ishable products comprises a number of unique 
items per product deﬁnition, depending upon 
whether it is bagged or bulk, small or large, or 
of a particular variety, so we aggregate over 
individual price-look-up (PLU) codes to the 
product level for red delicious apples, granny 
smith apples, fuji apples, bananas, and grapes. 
Variety is then measured by a simple PLU 
count for each aggregate product. 
The input price data are from various sec­
ondary sources. Weekly wholesale prices for 
the sample of fruits represented here are from 
the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of 
the USDA (grapes), the Washington Grow­
ers’ Clearing House (apples), or the Ecuador 
Ministry of Agriculture (bananas) and repre­
sent shipping-point FOB prices. Retailing costs 
are measured by an index of wages in retail 
and wholesale trade, an index of marketing 
costs, and a composite index of FIRE costs, all 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All 
input-price indices, however, are only available 
on a monthly basis. Therefore, the price in each 
week is ﬁrst set equal to the associated monthly 
price, and then converted to weekly series us­
ing a linear ﬁlter similar to Slade (1995) and 
Besanko, Gupta, and Jain (1998): 
(11) kt = 0.25ˆk,t−1 + 0.50ˆk,t + 0.25ˆk,t+1 
for input price index k . 
In order to capture retail competition at 
the ﬁrm level, all prices represent per-product, 
per-ﬁrm averages and all quantities are ex­
pressed on a per-ﬁrm basis. Therefore, each 
grocery chain is essentially regarded as one 
ﬁrm with multiple locations. Further, the “out­
side option” is calculated in a manner similar 
to Nevo (2001). Speciﬁcally, LA residents are 
11 All of the retail scanner data are from Fresh Look Marketing 
Group, Chicago, IL. 
assumed to consume each fresh fruit at the na­
tional average rate. U.S. per capital fruit con­
sumption values (Economic Research Service 
(ERS) USDA) are then multiplied by the pop­
ulation of LA county (the market area of the 
sample ﬁrms) to obtain a total market con­
sumption value for each fruit. Prices for each 
component of the outside option are calculated 
as expenditure-weighted averages of each type 
of fruit in the sample. The outside option is 
then the difference between total LA expendi­
ture and that represented by the sample ﬁrms. 
Any error can be due to differences between 
LA and national consumption rates, or to fruit 
purchased outside of the retail channel repre­
sented here. If these errors are random, then 
the parameter estimates remain valid.12 
Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of 
the data used to estimate the demand, pricing, 
and variety equations at the individual ﬁrm 
level, while table 2 shows descriptive statis­
tics for market-level variables. The data show 
considerable heterogeneity, both among retail 
ﬁrms and among products within each ﬁrm. 
For example, Firm 2 offers the lowest aver­
age price, or next to lowest, for all ﬁve prod­
ucts, but also shows the greatest variability in 
price among all sample ﬁrms. This suggests that 
it uses a HI-LO strategy more aggressively 
than the others. Firm 1, on the other hand, 
has the smallest market share for all ﬁve prod­
ucts and also offers the least variety among all 
ﬁrms. Firm 3 maintains the broadest offering 
of fresh fruit, but also has the highest prices 
for most products, with the exception of ba­
nanas, for which it has the lowest price. It is 
often suggested that retailers use bananas as a 
loss leader due to their broad appeal to a large 
number of consumers, and ﬁrm 3 may be us­
ing loss leadership to generate sales for other, 
high-margin products within its product line. 
Whether this is in fact the case, however, re­
quires more detailed empirical analysis. Firm 4 
has the largest market share for the ﬁve sample 
products (24.3%), while ﬁrm 1 has the smallest 
market share (10.9%). The ﬁrms are relatively 
similar in terms of the variability of market 
share as they are clustered between a coefﬁ­
cient of variation of 35.6% (ﬁrm 3) and 45.4% 
(ﬁrm 2). At the market level, table 2 shows that 
all wholesale prices were very volatile over the 
sample period—each has a coefﬁcient of vari­
ation of over 50%. Further, the outside option, 
12 See Nevo (2000, 2001) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) 
for an extensive discussion of the role and construction of the out­
side option in discrete choice models. 
Table 1. Summary of LA Retail Scanner Data—Chain Level, January 1998—December 1999 
Chain 1 Chain 3 
Mean S. D. Min. Max. Mean S. D. Min. Max. N 
p11 0.983 0.116 0.409 1.237 p13 0.920 0.104 0.642 1.223 104 
p21 0.983 0.134 0.688 1.242 p23 0.934 0.105 0.556 1.313 104 
p31 1.214 0.196 0.629 1.699 p33 1.224 0.225 0.516 1.989 104 
p41 0.558 0.044 0.311 0.603 p43 0.606 0.049 0.293 0.697 104 
p51 1.849 0.455 0.777 3.320 p53 2.057 0.513 0.812 3.912 104 
S11 0.015 0.006 0.004 0.041 S13 0.021 0.009 0.003 0.069 104 
S21 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.021 S23 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.037 104 
S31 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.014 S33 0.013 0.008 0.001 0.058 104 
S41 0.035 0.010 0.009 0.059 S43 0.108 0.018 0.068 0.200 104 
S51 0.045 0.025 0.009 0.112 S53 0.087 0.059 0.004 0.281 104 
N1 52.606 5.054 37.000 64.000 N3 70.529 6.641 53.000 83.000 104 
Chain 2 Chain 4 
p12 0.791 0.129 0.424 0.951 p14 0.936 0.064 0.650 1.086 104 
p22 0.857 0.136 0.440 1.131 p24 0.987 0.052 0.796 1.082 104 
p32 1.050 0.257 0.578 1.577 p34 1.432 0.147 0.985 1.677 104 
p42 0.565 0.027 0.373 0.597 p44 0.531 0.022 0.433 0.575 104 
p52 1.982 0.460 0.752 2.946 p54 2.274 0.551 1.568 4.087 104 
S12 0.022 0.008 0.010 0.053 S14 0.019 0.010 0.012 0.067 104 
S22 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.023 S24 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.038 104 
S32 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.021 S34 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.047 104 
S42 0.086 0.015 0.052 0.148 S44 0.102 0.009 0.080 0.123 104 
S52 0.079 0.062 0.011 0.302 S54 0.048 0.040 0.008 0.224 104 
N2 73.663 4.671 63.000 83.000 N4 77.328 9.547 59.000 97.000 104 
aIn this table, pji is the price of product j in ﬁrm i, and Sji is the marginal market share (i.e., share of the entire market) of product j in ﬁrm i . The products 
are indexed as follows: j = 1 is red delicious apples, j = 2 is granny smith apples, j = 3 is fuji apples, j = 4 is bananas, and j = 5 is grapes. Firm names are not 
disclosed for reasons of conﬁdentiality. The variable Ni measures the number of distinct SKUs within each ﬁrm i. 
or fruit not purchased from any of the sample 
retailers, consists of only 25% of the market, 
so that our data on the top four retailers in­
cludes the majority of purchases made in the 
LA retail produce market. 
Although estimating (4), (9), and (10) to­
gether is preferred on efﬁciency grounds, the 
Table 2. Summary of LA Retail Scanner 
Data—Market Level, January 1998— 
December 1999 
Meana S.D. Min Max N 
v1 3.215 0.081 3.011 3.409 104 
v2 6.614 0.223 6.075 7.025 104 
v3 3.123 0.052 2.953 3.226 104 
w1 0.257 0.039 0.190 0.330 104 
w2 0.337 0.029 0.282 0.439 104 
w3 0.352 0.079 0.211 0.584 104 
w4 0.209 0.060 0.113 0.338 104 
w5 0.156 0.062 0.088 0.380 104 
S0 0.250 0.139 0.073 0.504 104 
aIn this table, vi is input price i for i = 1, 2, 3; wj is FOB (wholesale) price j for 
j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, and S0 is the market share of the outside option. Input prices 
are indexed as follows: i = 1 is an index of wages in retail and wholesale 
trade, i = 2 is an index of marketing costs, and i = 3 is an index of FIRE costs. 
size of the estimation problem required se­
quential estimation of the demand and supply, 
or price and variety response blocks.13 Elas­
ticity estimates from the system of equations 
described by (4), therefore, are included in (9) 
and (10) in order to recover the conjectural 
elasticity estimates. In both systems, however, 
prices and variety are clearly endogenous, so 
an instrumental variable procedure is used for 
each block of equations. Instruments are se­
lected that are likely to be correlated with the 
dependent variables, yet uncorrelated with the 
errors in each equation. For the demand sys­
tem, the set of instruments includes the set of 
wholesale fresh fruit prices, the supermarket 
cost indices described above and lagged val­
ues of each product’s retail price, number of 
products offered, and market share. Because 
of the large number of parameters in the de­
mand system, this set of instruments is still not 
sufﬁcient to obtain unique estimates of each. 
13 The second-stage parameter estimates will be consistent, how­
ever, because the values estimated in the ﬁrst stage are appropri­
ate instruments for the endogenous quantities in the second-stage 
model. 
Consequently, we follow Villas-Boas (2003), 
and Draganska and Jain (2005) and interact 
these instruments with a set of product- and 
ﬁrm-binary-indicator variables. 
The ﬁrst-stage results of the NL3SLS proce­
dure provides us with some reassurance that 
the set of instruments is a good one. Regress­
ing price on the set of instruments yields an R2 
of 0.986, while regressing variety on the same 
instruments gives an R2 of 0.983. In the price 
regression, 45.7% of the instruments are statis­
tically signiﬁcant at a 10% level, while 44.3% 
are signiﬁcant in the variety regression. The 
same set of instruments are also used to esti­
mate the supply block. Both blocks of equa­
tions are estimated using NL3SLS. 
Price and variety responses by rival ﬁrms 
are identiﬁed in the system by the nonlinearity 
of demand in both price and variety (Villas-
Boas). Although the NCES, of course, has 
constant elasticities of substitution, price and 
variety elasticities vary over time, ﬁrms and 
products so there is sufﬁcient variation to iden­
tify all the response parameters in the system. 
Results and Discussion 
We assess the goodness-of-ﬁt of both blocks of 
equations with a system R2 as well as a Wald 
chi-square test statistic that compares the es­
timated and a null model that consists of con­
stant terms only. The results in table 3 indi­
cate that the model provides a good ﬁt to the 
data, providing an R2 value of 0.8051 and eas­
ily rejecting the null hypothesis that all popula­
tion parameters are zero. Tests of the price and 
variety response hypotheses outlined above 
are conducted using the conjectural elastic­
ity values estimated in the supply-side model. 
Table 3. Nested CES Parameter Estimates: LA Retail Fresh Fruit, 1998–99 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 
Parameters Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
i 0.040∗ 0.003 0.176∗ 0.006 0.123∗ 0.004 0.202∗ 0.007 
1i1 6.199∗ 1.023 3.620∗ 1.134 −0.948 1.003 3.668∗ 1.021 
2i1 1.074 0.984 8.705∗ 0.977 9.082∗ 0.905 16.652∗ 0.961 
3i1 5.963∗ 1.007 −11.433∗ 1.093 −6.524∗ 1.020 −17.874∗ 1.134 
4i1 0.096 0.262 0.298∗ 0.087 0.255∗ 0.118 0.532∗ 0.091 
1i2 −18.536∗ 1.289 −0.533 1.051 −2.050 1.224 0.269 1.287 
2i2 −0.569 0.961 9.526∗ 0.862 16.586∗ 1.198 4.580∗ 0.930 
3i2 2.351∗ 0.984 −10.341∗ 1.026 −16.326∗ 1.264 −4.375∗ 1.026 
4i2 0.209 0.248 0.298∗ 0.085 0.229 0.118 0.532∗ 0.095 
1i3 23.458∗ 1.449 6.678∗ 1.181 15.514∗ 1.293 10.814∗ 1.339 
2i3 −0.807 0.975 2.114∗ 1.065 0.926 0.889 5.891∗ 0.869 
3i3 4.151∗ 1.010 1.730 1.009 1.959∗ 0.979 −9.490∗ 1.053 
4i3 0.499 0.255 0.378∗ 0.088 0.285∗ 0.114 0.519∗ 0.097 
1i4 −2.297∗ 1.132 7.908∗ 1.069 −7.616∗ 1.159 −4.535∗ 1.238 
2i4 10.730∗ 1.034 22.073∗ 1.427 17.275∗ 1.097 10.838∗ 0.979 
3i4 −4.073∗ 1.006 −23.600∗ 1.433 −9.853∗ 0.980 −9.316∗ 0.968 
4i4 −0.353 0.282 0.109 0.097 0.272∗ 0.116 0.557∗ 0.088 
1i5 1.541 1.002 −4.797∗ 1.130 −2.413∗ 1.035 11.474∗ 1.370 
2i5 15.491∗ 1.206 2.623∗ 1.020 3.772∗ 1.088 5.451∗ 0.931 
3i5 −5.175∗ 0.879 −0.985 0.646 −1.535∗ 0.581 −2.470∗ 0.516 
4i5 0.962∗ 0.236 0.512∗ 0.098 0.368∗ 0.128 0.571∗ 0.101 
 0.870∗ 0.007 
q 1,322.349 
R2 0.805 
 2 11,214.79∗ 
aIn this table, parameter kij refers to the demand-parameter estimate for variable k, ﬁrm i, product j, where k = 1 is the product-chain-speciﬁc preference 
parameter, k = 2 is the direct promotion effect, k = 3 is the  price∗promotion interaction effect, and k = 4 is the variety effect, measured by Ni , the average 
number of products offered per ﬁrm per period, j = 1 is red delicious apples, j = 2 is granny smith apples, j = 3 is fuji apples, j = 4 is bananas, and j = 5 is  
grapes. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level, where “SE” is the standard error of the parameter estimate. The i are elasticities of substitution 
among products within ﬁrm i, while  is the elasticity of substitution among ﬁrms. Seasonal indicator variables are suppressed to conserve space, but are 
all signiﬁcantly different from zero. The NL3SLS objective function value is given by q (Greene 1993) while R2 is the system-coefﬁcient of determination 
(McElroy 1977). The  2 test statistic compares the estimated model to the “null model” with constant terms only. At 5% and 125 degrees of freedom, the 
critical chi-square value is 152.094. 
However, there is also considerable interest in 
the validity of the CES demand system and the 
insights it provides. If the elasticity of substi­
tution among ﬁrms is equal to 1.0, then there 
is no need to consider a nested system: Con­
sumers in this case would regard retail ﬁrms 
as perfect substitutes. Similarly, at the product 
level, an elasticity of substitution of 1.0 implies 
that all products are perfect substitutes. Based 
on the results in table 3, a Wald chi-square 
statistic for the hypothesis that  = 1.0 is 17.50, 
while the critical value at one degree of free­
dom at a 5% level is 3.84. Therefore, we clearly 
reject the null hypothesis, which suggests 
that a two-level nested system is preferred. 
Among the product-level elasticities of substi­
tution, we again reject the null hypothesis that 
i = 1.0 in each case, which implies that dif­
ferent types of fruit are indeed imperfect sub­
stitutes for one another.14 Further, Durbin– 
Watson tests for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation 
among the errors of each equation in the de­
mand system failed to reject the null hypothe­
sis of no autocorrelation for all products in all 
stores (H0 :  ij = 0). 
Anderson and de Palma (1992) raise the 
issue of whether we should expect greater 
differentiation (less substitutability) within a 
particular ﬁrm or among different ﬁrms. In 
the supermarket example, consumers choose 
many types of goods to ﬁll fundamentally dif­
fering needs, but each ﬁrm sells roughly simi­
lar types of products. Consequently, we expect 
to ﬁnd greater product differentiation within 
each ﬁrm than retailer differentiation across 
ﬁrms. The results in table 3 support this, as 
the product-level substitution elasticities are 
signiﬁcantly lower than the ﬁrm-level esti­
mate. Interpreted as measures of heterogene­
ity, these estimates also mean that differences 
among products are perceived to be far greater 
than differences among ﬁrms. Although four-
point estimates of the product-level substitu­
tion elasticities do not permit a formal test 
of the hypothesis that greater product hetero­
geneity leads to more variety, or longer prod­
uct lines, the estimates in table 3 provide some 
evidence contrary to this idea. Whereas ﬁrm 1 
offers only 52.6 products on average and has 
a substitution elasticity of 0.040, ﬁrm 4 offers 
77.33 products and has a substitution elasticity 
among products of 0.202—the highest of all our 
14 The test statistic for the null hypothesis that 1 = 1.0 is 303.689, 
for 2 = 1.0 is 147.053, for 3 = 1.0 is 219.775, and for 4 = 1.0 
is 119.046. In each case, the test statistic is chi-square distributed 
with one degree of freedom. 
sample ﬁrms. Anderson’s argument maintains 
that if products are not readily substitutable 
for one another, a ﬁrm can introduce more 
brands without fear of cannibalizing existing 
sales. However, as Hamilton (2003) points out, 
the cost of cannibalized sales is also larger in 
this case, as retail margins increase with prod­
uct differentiation. The empirical model pro­
vides some evidence that the latter effect is 
indeed the dominant one. 
The remaining parameters in the demand 
system comprise the product-level quality 
functions,� ij. Whereas Morey et al. (2001) as­
sume common quality parameters among each 
of their primary-level choices, this alternative 
was rejected in the LA retail data in favor of 
product- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters. In each 
case, a positive parameter estimate suggests 
that the perceived “quality” or underlying 
demand for the product rises in the associated 
variable or, in the case of the intercept term, 
that the inherent preference for the good in 
question is higher than average. In this respect, 
the results in table 3 indicate that consumers 
in three of the four ﬁrms express a preference 
for red delicious apples, while consumers in 
all ﬁrms tend to favor fuji apples. Perhaps sur­
prising, given the importance of bananas to 
fresh produce retailing, consumers in three of 
four ﬁrms tend to show a negative preference 
for bananas. Given the importance consumers 
place in the quality of a ﬁrm’s fresh produce, 
retailers are particularly interested in the effec­
tiveness of price-promotion programs for fresh 
products. For virtually all products and ﬁrms, 
the promotion variable represents a strongly 
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on demand. A positive 
value for the binary sales indicator means that 
demand increases during a sale, while a nega­
tive interaction term means that demand also 
becomes less elastic. Both of these outcomes 
are desirable from the retailer’s point of view. 
While it is not the primary objective of this ar­
ticle, it would be possible to calculate the proﬁt 
implications of a sale in each case with the CES 
demand estimates. 
With respect to the demand for variety, the 
ik4 parameter shows the effect on the de­
mand for product k in ﬁrm i of increasing the 
number of products offered within the fruit 
category. Consumers may value a variety of 
choices in fresh fruit if they are easily satiated 
in either the taste or nutritional attributes they 
desire when consuming fruit (McAlister and 
Pesemier 1982; Chintagunta 1998), if they seek 
a hedge against future changes in taste (Walsh 
1995) or if they desire more attributes than one 
Table 4. Firm-Level Price and Variety Elasticities 
Elasticity of: 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
With Respect to:a ε1k SE ε2k SE ε3k SE ε4k SE 
P1 −1.151∗ 0.011 0.146∗ 0.011 0.146∗ 0.011 0.146∗ 0.011 
P2 0.321∗ 0.048 −0.976∗ 0.048 0.321∗ 0.048 0.321∗ 0.048 
P3 0.207∗ 0.020 0.207∗ 0.020 −1.090∗ 0.020 0.207∗ 0.020 
P4 0.624∗ 0.072 0.624∗ 0.072 0.624∗ 0.072 −0.674∗ 0.072 

1k Se 
2k Se 
3k Se 
4k Se 
N1 0.179∗ 0.004 −0.022∗ 0.004 −0.022∗ 0.004 −0.022∗ 0.004 
N2 −0.226∗ 0.042 0.685∗ 0.042 −0.226∗ 0.042 −0.226∗ 0.042 
N3 −0.071∗ 0.014 −0.071∗ 0.014 0.369∗ 0.014 −0.071∗ 0.014 
N4 −0.629∗ 0.110 −0.629∗ 0.110 −0.629∗ 0.110 0.675∗ 0.110 
aIn this table, all subscripts refer to chain i, so Qi is the volume of sales from ﬁrm i, Pi is the price index for ﬁrm i, and Ni is the number of products offered 
for sale by ﬁrm i. All elasticities are calculated at sample means. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level where “SE” is the standard error of the 
parameter estimate. 
item can provide (Farquhar and Rao 1976). 
Product variants in this case may mean differ­
ent sizes of apple, alternative package forms, 
or different colors of grape, for example. Al­
though Draganska and Jain (2005) provide ar­
guments for, and show empirical support for, a 
concave effect of variety on market share, here 
we maintain a linear relationship to keep the 
model as parsimonious as possible. In general, 
the results tend to be broadly positive, partic­
ularly in the case of fresh grapes, where many 
would argue that variety not only appeals to 
consumers’ nutritional needs for diversity, but 
is also visually appealing as well. These results 
are similar to Draganska and Jain (2005) in yo­
gurt or Bayus and Putsis (1999) in personal 
computers. 
Next, consider ﬁrm-level strategies. Table 4 
presents estimates of “fresh fruit” price elas­
ticities for each ﬁrm. Consistent with common 
notions of the competitiveness of the super­
market sector, the price elasticity of demand 
for each ﬁrm is near unity, except for the fourth. 
As expected, the ﬁrms are substitutes for 
each other and, in general, strong substitutes 
both in an economic and a statistical sense. 
With respect to variety elasticities, all of the 
own elasticities are positive and signiﬁcant, 
while the cross-elasticities are negative and sig­
niﬁcant. These elasticities provide some poten­
tially valuable information. For example, the 
fact that the second and fourth ﬁrms both face 
price-inelastic demand, and relatively high-
variety elasticities suggests that these ﬁrms 
may beneﬁt from higher prices and longer 
product lines among their fresh fruit. However, 
greater insight into the strategic value of 
these changes is provided by the supply-side 
estimates of each ﬁrm’s price and variety 
response. 
These estimates are shown in table 5. Based 
on the R2 value and chi-square test results re­
ported in this table, the model clearly provides 
a good ﬁt to the data. As in Vilcassim, Kadiyali, 
and Chintagunta (1999), each structural equa­
tion allows for ﬁrm-speciﬁc “multiple interac­
tions” or expected price and variety responses 
by rivals to a change in variety, or to a change in 
price. Given that these responses are derived 
in a Nash equilibrium framework, all are as­
sumed to be optimal given the choices made by 
other ﬁrms. By assuming general Nash behav­
ior on the part of all ﬁrms, we offer a more com­
prehensive analysis of product-line decisions 
than Draganska and Jain (2005), who assume 
Bertrand–Nash (zero conduct parameters) in 
both prices and variety. With respect to price 
behavior, the conjectural elasticity estimates 
presented in the top panel show how rivals 
are anticipated to react to changes in the price 
of ﬁrm i. If the estimate is greater than zero, 
rival ﬁrms are expected to raise their prices in 
response to a rise in ﬁrm i’s price in a cooper­
ative way. Clearly, the results in table 5 indi­
cate that the retailers are far from competitive 
(	ik = 0). Rather, the estimates in each case 
suggest a range from mildly cooperative (ﬁrm 2 
with respect to ﬁrm 4) to strongly cooperative 
(ﬁrm 2 with respect to ﬁrm 3). These results 
also suggest that price and variety are strate­
gic complements as each ﬁrm expects its rivals 
to increase the number of products they offer 
in response to an increase in the ﬁrm’s own 
price. One explanation for a positive variety 
Table 5. LA Supermarket Price and Variety Response Elasticities, 1998–99 
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
 
Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
 
	i1 1.000 NA 0.403∗ 0.023 0.455∗ 0.034 0.232∗ 0.005 
	i2 0.458∗ 0.020 1.000 NA 0.158∗ 0.020 0.136∗ 0.004 
	i3 0.565∗ 0.023 0.678∗ 0.024 1.000 NA 0.127∗ 0.004 
	i4 0.326∗ 0.015 0.072∗ 0.016 0.239∗ 0.017 1.000 NA 
i1 1.000∗ NA 0.126∗ 0.003 1.210∗ 0.049 0.211∗ 0.005 
i2 0.425∗ 0.024 1.000 NA 0.186∗ 0.032 0.221∗ 0.006 
i3 0.149∗ 0.003 0.683∗ 0.022 1.000 NA 0.053 0.041 
i4 0.134∗ 0.011 0.030∗ 0.013 0.139∗ 0.012 1.000 NA 
 i1 0.104∗ 0.050 1.969∗ 0.098 0.608∗ 0.027 0.458∗ 0.029 
 i3 −0.407∗ 0.052 1.347∗ 0.051 0.824∗ 0.044 −0.102∗ 0.032 
 i13 0.010∗ 0.004 0.424∗ 0.043 0.142∗ 0.010 0.081∗ 0.011 
i1 −2.826∗ 0.137 −1.540∗ 0.185 0.077∗ 0.032 2.428∗ 0.030 
i2 0.371∗ 0.014 0.859∗ 0.053 10.999∗ 0.037 10.909∗ 0.039 
 i1 1.000 NA −0.149 0.080 0.082∗ 0.009 0.052∗ 0.011 
 i2 −0.210∗ 0.055 1.000 NA −0.058∗ 0.008 −0.043∗ 0.006 
 i3 0.412∗ 0.005 1.118∗ 0.075 1.000 NA 0.017∗ 0.007 
 i4 0.160∗ 0.056 −0.566∗ 0.076 −0.001 0.002 1.000 NA 
i1 1.000 NA 1.155∗ 0.073 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.014 
i2 0.146∗ 0.006 1.000 NA −0.035∗ 0.011 −0.018∗ 0.009 
i3 1.058∗ 0.007 1.306∗ 0.074 1.000∗ NA 0.009 0.009 
i4 0.380∗ 0.046 −0.309∗ 0.055 0.002∗ −0.013 1.000 NA 
q 437.705 
 2 212.734 
R2 0.996 
aIn this table, 	ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect to price changes by ﬁrm i, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety with 
respect to price changes by ﬁrm i, ik is the conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s variety with respect to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i,  ik is the 
conjectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i, and  il and im are parameters of the retailing and variety cost 
functions, respectively. To keep the response-system parameter space as small as possible, two input price indices are used: retail and wholesale wages and 
advertising costs. A single asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level, where “SE” is the standard error of the parameter estimate. q is the NL3SLS objective 
function value, while R2 is the system-coefﬁcient of determination (McElroy 1977). At 5% and 60 degrees of freedom, the critical chi-square value is 79.082. 
response to price is as follows: If ﬁrm i raises its 
retail price, this allows ﬁrm j to capture market 
share, and ﬁrm j will tend to increase its own 
retail price in response. To maintain its higher 
iso-proﬁt curve, and prevent erosion of market 
share back to ﬁrm i, ﬁrm j increases variety as 
well. Higher prices appear to intensify variety 
competition among retailers. As a result, su­
permarkets appear to behave cooperatively in 
their pricing decisions for fresh fruit, both in re­
sponse to rival price and product-line choices. 
The bottom panel of table 5 shows that va­
riety decisions are less uniform with respect to 
their implications for retailer strategy. With re­
spect to the expected variety response of rivals 
to changes in a ﬁrm’s own product variety (the 
ik parameters), a positive elasticity suggests 
that product lines are strategic complements— 
if one ﬁrm lengthens its product line, the other 
ﬁrms respond by increasing the number of va­
rieties they offer as well. It is unclear whether 
variety proliferation by one ﬁrm leads to such 
reciprocation by its rivals. Firm 1 expects all re­
tailers to respond to an increase in its product 
line with countervailing increases in their own 
product lines, but ﬁrms 3 and 4 expect ﬁrm 2 
to counter an increase in product variety with 
a contraction in its product line. 
The  ik parameters in table 5 show the con­
jectural elasticity of ﬁrm k’s price with respect 
to the number of products offered by ﬁrm i. 
A positive elasticity, therefore, suggests that 
product lines are strategic complements—if 
one ﬁrm product line, it will be able to raise 
its price, thus leaving more of the market for 
the other ﬁrms. As in the case of a simple 
price increase described above, with more mar­
ket share the other ﬁrm can raise its price to 
extract more surplus (as suggested by the pos­
itive ik elasticities in table 5), or may either 
shrink their product lines to reduce cost, or 
lengthen them to build more pricing power. 
Nonetheless, it is unclear from table 5 whether 
variety competition softens or stiffens price 
competition. Firm 1 appears to make product 
line decisions on the expectation that ﬁrm 2 
will respond to an increase in variety with 
a price decrease, but ﬁrms 3 and 4 will re­
spond in a cooperative fashion with price in­
creases. Moreover, each ﬁrm expects ﬁrm 3 to 
respond cooperatively to a product-line expan­
sion. The lack of uniformity of variety-induced 
responses may be due to the fact that changes 
in product line are not generally as transparent 
as prices. Supermarkets tend not to advertise 
many of the minor products they offer, but typ­
ically publish as many prices as possible on a 
weekly basis. However, we can make a general 
conclusion that retailers, on average, appear 
to cooperate in both price and product-line 
decisions. 
Further, because price elasticities in the CES 
model depend upon the elasticity of substi­
tution among products, the results in table 5 
can also be interpreted as indirect tests of the 
ﬁrm-heterogeneity hypothesis outlined in the 
“introduction” section. In the lower block of 
results shown in table 5, a positive conjectural 
elasticity estimate (ik) suggests that ﬁrm i will 
offer more products for sale the higher the 
cross-price elasticity of demand, or the less het­
erogeneous it perceives the retail market to be. 
This ﬁnding is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of both Hamilton (2003) and An­
derson and de Palma (1992). The intuition for 
this is that if ﬁrms are largely viewed as homo­
geneous by consumers, then each will seek to 
differentiate itself by offering a greater range 
of products, increasing overall demand in the 
market by drawing consumption from the out­
side good. If doing so causes other ﬁrms to raise 
their prices in response to the overall increase 
in demand, then they each have further incen­
tive to offer more variety. Although this pro­
cess is limited by the rising cost of variety (note 
the convexity of each of the variety cost func­
tions in table 5), it can perhaps explain in part 
the rise of supercenters and other “big box” re­
tailers in markets such as children’s toys, con­
sumer electronics, and books. 
Conclusions and Implications 
This article provides some empirical evidence 
on the strategic interaction of pricing and 
product-line decisions made by supermarket 
retailers. Theoretical models of price and va­
riety competition suggest that retailer hetero­
geneity reduces variety, or the length of a 
ﬁrm’s product line, while product heterogene­
ity increases equilibrium variety. While other 
studies investigate this question using restric­
tive, nested-logit-based models, this is the ﬁrst 
to empirically test the variety/heterogeneity 
relationship using a ﬂexible, nested CES 
model. 
The data used in this article consists of two 
years of weekly scanner data for four ma­
jor retail ﬁrms in the LA market. We use 
data from an unbranded, fresh product cat­
egory in order to minimize the inﬂuence of 
manufacturer interference in retail-sales deci­
sions and to gain access to accurate and rele­
vant wholesale price data. These data are used 
to estimate a fully structural system of fresh 
fruit demand and ﬁrst-order conditions with 
respect to ﬁrm-level prices and product num­
bers. With this approach, the estimated conjec­
tural elasticities represent retailers’ response 
to ﬁrm heterogeneity in price and variety 
strategies. 
Estimates of the demand system provide a 
number of interesting results. First, we ﬁnd a 
lower elasticity of substitution among products 
within each ﬁrm than among ﬁrms, as expected 
given the similarity of product offerings among 
supermarkets. Second, we ﬁnd considerable 
support for research among consumer prod­
uct goods retailing (Chintagunta 2002) that 
ﬁnds price promotion to be highly effective in 
increasing product-level market share. Third, 
variety does indeed have a strongly positive 
impact on sales volume in a particular product 
line. Fourth, we ﬁnd that sales at the ﬁrm level 
are nearly approximately unit-elastic with re­
spect to price, and uniformly positively related 
to ﬁrm-level measures of variety. 
Using the demand system estimates, we then 
estimate price and variety response equations 
that allow for multiple strategic interactions 
between rival ﬁrm’s price and variety deci­
sions. Of primary interest among these esti­
mates, we ﬁnd that each ﬁrm tends to follow a 
“cooperative” or complementary variety strat­
egy with respect to certain rivals, but that such 
cooperation does not exist among all retailers. 
Following different variety strategies with re­
spect to some rivals is likely driven by per­
ceived proximities in other respects, such as 
location, price levels, or private-label strate­
gies. Further, we use these estimates to test 
the hypothesis that greater ﬁrm-level hetero­
geneity leads to a smaller assortment of prod­
ucts offered per ﬁrm. We ﬁnd some support 
for this hypothesis; however, the results do not 
support the corollary hypothesis of Anderson 
and de Palma (1992) that greater product-level 
heterogeneity leads to longer product lines. 
This result is consistent with the countervail­
ing effects of product variety suggested by 
Hamilton (2003). 
While this research provides many impli­
cations for the extent of competitive inter­
actions among supermarket retailers, perhaps 
the most important concerns the consequences 
for how the supermarket industry is likely to 
evolve. Driven by factors outside their imme­
diate market niche, namely competition from 
other store formats, traditional supermarkets 
of the type we study here have been reducing 
retail prices in real terms in a number of cate­
gories. The empirical model suggests that such 
reductions in price are likely to lead product 
variety to respond in the same direction, lead­
ing to smaller product assortments and shorter 
product lines. In fact, this is precisely what is 
occurring now. Through “efﬁcient assortment” 
and category management programs, super­
markets are reducing SKU counts throughout 
the store in order to save inventory and han­
dling costs as well as to allow the introduction 
of their own private-label brands. 
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